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ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION MUSICAL CHAIRS: WILL THERE BE A 
SEAT REMAINING FOR THE SMALL GROUP OR SOLO PRACTICE? 
ABSTRACT 
Accountable Care Organization (ACO) is a new and untested concept in healthcare delivery and 
payment, when it was introduced in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 as the new 2012 payment 
model for Medicare.  The purpose of this study was to estimate the likelihood of engagement in 
ACOs by small group and solo healthcare practitioners. Evaluation of five cases studies showed 
that significant organizational, financial, and technological challenge had to be met in order to 
launch an ACO. Sufficient resources to meet those challenges were best supplied by large 
organizations.  Small or solo practices participated only through varying levels of integration as 
salaried physicians or in Independent Practice Associations or Physician Hospital Organizations.   
Key Words:  Accountable Care Organization, Physicians, Integrated healthcare delivery, 
Independent Practice Associations, payment model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 addressed a wide range of healthcare issues.  
One significant provision called for a new paradigm in payment for healthcare services in 
relation to the value that they provide.  This call for change was an effort to answer concerns 
raised by the continued escalation of United States (U.S.) healthcare spending that have reached 
17.3% of U.S. gross domestic product in 2009 while underperforming other nations on quality 
and patient satisfaction (DeVore 2011).  Wide variations in the quality and cost of care as well as 
lack of coordination have been additional concerns (Purington, Gauthier, Patel, & Miller 2011).   
 In order to address these concerns of quality, beneficiary outcomes, and cost of care, the 
ACA directed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to foster delivery system 
reform through Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), (U.S.DHHS 2010).  An ACO is 
defined by CMS as an organization of healthcare providers that agrees to be accountable for the 
quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-
for-service program who are assigned to it (U.S.DHHS, 2010).  The term can also refer to private 
sector organizations and is defined by the Commonwealth Fund (2010) as provider-led health 
care systems that are accountable for patient health outcomes and coordinate health care across 
providers and settings.   The structures of ACOs will likely differ, but all should be guided by 
three over arching principles:  payment reform, performance measurement, and delivery system 
changes (Lee, Casalino, Fisher, & Wilensky 2010). 
 Payment reform has been called for because the prevalent fee-for-service system is 
viewed by healthcare policy consensus as ineffective and unsustainable (McClellan, McKethan, 
Lewis, Roski, & Fisher 2010).  Because payments are based on volume and intensity, this system 
is credited with promoting more services and higher costs without yielding a better outcome.  
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Perverse incentives have been attributed to provision of healthcare under this current payment 
model (DeVore 2011). The new model has a shared savings structure that is designed to 
incentivize lower cost care.  If an ACO can provide quality care to its assigned population at a 
cost below its budget benchmark, it will receive a portion of those savings (Merlis 2010).  
 ACOs will also have to meet quality performance measures to qualify as Medicare 
ACOs.  These measures are expected to include clinical process measurements as well as patient 
care outcomes, rates of utilization, and patient experience or satisfaction measures and will be 
detailed in final program regulations (Berwic 2010). 
 Delivery system changes focus on reducing fragmentation of care, which is thought to 
contribute to overuse, and involve increasing coordination of care across healthcare settings.  
This will require increasingly integrated organizations, either in formal structure or 
communication, or both, because the accountability for an ACO’s patients’ costs of care will be 
shared across the spectrum of care (Purington et al 2011.) 
ACOs were reportedly first discussed in a Medicare Payment Advisory Committee 
meeting in November of 2006. The “Accountable Care Organization” term was coined at that 
2006 meeting by Elliot Fisher, a Dartmouth professor of medicine who also co-authored a 
landmark article in Health Affairs on the concept (Fisher, Stalger, Bynum, & Gottlieb 2007).   
Fisher and his colleagues sought to advance previous quality initiatives such as Pay-For-
Performance (P4P) from focusing on the individual provider’s performance to one which would 
assess quality across the continuum of a patient’s care.  Fisher et al (2007) posited that 
organizations which could be held responsible for a defined population’s care would deliver less 
fragmented care of a higher quality and at a lower cost, suggesting a new organizational model 
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of an “extended hospital medical staff,” a virtual grouping of distinct entities, based on a 
patient’s most common sites of care.   
In 2009, Fisher again teamed with Dartmouth colleagues as well as the Brookings 
Institution to further discuss the ACO concept, this time offering both ideas for incentivization 
and data suggesting a potential savings target (Fisher et al 2009). “Shared savings” was 
described as a payment reform concept of modifying fee-for-service reimbursement to allow 
ACOs to retain part of the benefit of reducing costs.   Several structural ACO requirements were 
proposed, along with defining eligible organizations, determining which Medicare beneficiaries 
would be assigned to ACOs, setting benchmarks and cost performance targets, performance 
measurement, and savings distribution.   Empirical analysis and simulations supported a gradual 
decline in Medicare spending under an ACO model (Fisher et a, 2009).     
 Following the legislation of the Shared Savings Program and Accountable Care 
Organizations in the ACA of 2010, the literature on the subject was dominated by two types of 
articles, case studies of building similar organizations and articles espousing either 
improvements or problems with the concept.  A common concern was the legal ramification of 
healthcare businesses’ collaboration in terms of antitrust and fraud and abuse laws (Leibenluft 
2011).  Another issue was the method of patient attribution to the ACOs and how to engage them 
in the process (Sinaiko & Rosenthal 2010).   Goldsmith (2011) asserted that the concept was 
flawed with insufficient incentives and a history of mistrust between hospitals and physicians.  
Luft (2010) raised concern that the ACOs would be directly launched in January 2012 
without a demonstration project and without final regulations, giving providers little time to 
prepare for it.  Itchhaporia (2010) noted that most healthcare was delivered by independent 
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physicians that were not connected to large entities and questioned whether the ACO models 
would allow small practice participation.  The National Academies of Practice (2009) noted that 
75% of primary care physicians were in solo practice, and that other health professionals often 
worked in small practices, such as dentistry, optometry, podiatry, and psychology.   Even the 
CMS itself seemed to recognize the difficulty of incorporating the small practice into an ACO.  
Dr. Donald Berwick, the administrator for CMS, called for commentary on what standards and 
policies should be adopted to ensure the inclusion of solo and small practice providers in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program and the ACO models (Berwick 2010).  
 It is unclear whether small group and solo healthcare practitioners would have an 
opportunity to participate in a proposed new model of care, the ACO.  The purpose of this study 
was to estimate the likelihood of engagement in ACOs by small group and solo healthcare 
practitioners  
METHODOLOGY 
The primary hypothesis in this research was: small group and solo practices would be unable to 
participate in the new payment model.  A secondary hypothesis was: the launch of the ACO 
would be a further force toward formal physician hospital integrations.   
 The methodology for this qualitative study was a literature research and review of case 
studies.  The electronic databases of PubMed, Academic Search Premier, and ProQuest were 
searched for the term ‘Accountable Care Organization’.  Reputable websites of the American 
Medical Association, the New England Journal of Medicine, CMS, and the Commonwealth Fund 
were also examined.  Citations and abstracts identified by the search were as well assessed in 
order to identify relevant articles.  A total of 39 articles were reviewed and 30 selected for this 
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research study.  The literature search was conducted by AV and validated by AC for this 
research project.  
RESULTS 
As a result of this research, five case studies of organizations using payment models which were 
predecessors for ACOs were found.  The organizations were: the Physician Group Practice 
(PGP) Demonstration, the Vermont ACO Pilot, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of 
Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract, Premier Healthcare Alliance, and Advocate 
Physician Partners/Advocate Health Care. They represented a broad variety of sponsoring 
organizations and structures.  Each was examined to assess for a method to engage small group 
or solo physician practices.  The results of the case analyses were summarized in Table 1.  
Case One: The Physician Group Practice  Demonstration 
 The Physician Group Practice Demonstration was a prototype for ACOs (Iglehart 2011a). 
This model was started in 2005 by CMS to examine whether healthcare costs savings could be 
generated and quality improved by reducing hospital and emergency admissions for Medicare 
beneficiaries.  Ten large groups of physicians participated, ranging in size from 232 to 1291 
physicians per group, with the incentive of sharing in potential Medicare savings. Results of the 
projects’ fourth year indicated that all 10 groups met essentially all of the quality goals.  
However, only five of the groups generated savings.  None of the 10 demonstration sites 
accommodated small or solo practice physicians.   
 Analysis of the PGP Demonstration data by Heywood & Kosel (2011) indicated that even 
large, experienced groups could not recover their original investment in less than five years.  
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Heywood & Kosel further suggested that the ACO payment model would result in financial 
challenges that made it unsuitable for most physician groups (see Table 1). 
Case Two: The Vermont Accountable Care Organization Pilot 
 The state of Vermont expressed interest in the ACO model in 2008 and instructed the 
Vermont Health Reform Commission to develop pilot programs.  This case was described in a 
research paper supported by the Commonwealth Fund (Hester, Lewis, & McKethan 2010).  With 
legislative support, Vermont had already established a base of medical home pilot programs and 
viewed the ACO model as a logical expansion into the community healthcare system level.  An 
interdisciplinary team was assembled consisting of a broad array of stakeholders, and two years 
of their study and design produced three healthcare provider organizations which were expected 
to launch ACOs in 2011.  The three organizational structures consisted of a Physician Hospital 
Organization (PHO), a Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC), and a community hospital 
with salaried physicians.  
The Vermont pilot found that only large, integrated care systems had the resources to 
support ACOs and concluded that small practices or rural systems would require state or federal 
support in order to succeed (see Table 1). 
Case Three: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract 
 BCBS of Massachusetts developed a payment model in 2009 that operated with not only 
shared savings but also shared risk (Chernew, Mechanic, Landon, & Safran 2011). In line with 
the goals of the proposed ACO model, i.e. providing patient-centered care that demonstrated 
quality along with cost savings, this program was called the Alternative Quality Contract.  
Healthcare providers furnished services to BCBS beneficiaries within a global budget and 
9 
 
received technical support and incentive payments from BCBS for improved quality.  Providers 
were at varying degrees of shared financial risk for care expenses exceeding budget and received 
shared savings on expenses less than budgeted.   
 All physicians who participated in the Alternative Quality Contract belonged to some 
structure that contracted on their behalf.  These included multispecialty groups, PHOs, or 
Independent Practice Associations (IPA). Those physicians in solo and small group practices  
unaffiliated with any large organization were not eligible to participate (see Table 1).  
Case Four: Premier Healthcare Alliance 
  In order to define best practices for implementing ACOs, Premier Healthcare Alliance 
formed the Accountable Care Implementation Collaborative, involving 25 healthcare systems 
which encompassed 80 hospitals and thousands of physicians (DeVore & Champion 2011).  
Criteria for participation included engaged executive leadership, private payer contracting 
ability, willingness to share performance data, tightly aligned physician networks, patient bases 
of at least 5,000 covered lives, acceptance of common cost and quality metrics, and internal data 
structures sufficient to collect and analyze data.  Members of the collaborative organized 
workgroups and researched all aspects of the ACO model.  They worked toward standard, 
workable solutions in areas such as quality measures and contracting.  Their intention was to 
have their organizations ready to enter ACO contracts by time CMS begins the model in 2012.   
 In the Premier Healthcare Alliance structure, physician practices were described as 
tightly integrated, with employed physicians, physician joint ventures, or multi-provider 
networks (see Table 1). 
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Case Five: Advocate Physician Partners/Advocate Health Care 
 Advocate Physician Partners was described by Shield, Patel, Manning, and Sacks (2011).  
This Illinois organization consisted of 3500 physicians who formed a joint venture with 
Advocate Health Care, a system of 10 hospitals.  Nine hundred of the physicians were directly 
employed by hospitals, but 2700 physicians ran independent practices.   
 This cooperative venture had a long, 15 year relationship.  Advocate Physician Partners’ 
focus had been to provide managed care contracting on behalf of the physicians.  Concentrating 
on strong physician leadership and involvement, the organization had already crafted successful 
quality improvement and cost reduction through P4P contracts with private payers.  Crucial to 
this task was receipt of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approval which had allowed the 
independent physicians to negotiate collectively.  Their P4P model with commercial payers had 
many similarities to the proposed ACO model.   With their experience in contracting and 
established network of providers, the partnership of Advocate Physician Partners and Advocate 
Health Care signed their first ACO contract in January of 2011 with a commercial payer, BSBS 
of Illinois.   
 With their PHO model, the partnership has claimed to have found a solution to engaging 
small group and solo physician practitioners.  However, the organization had not only cleared 
legal hurdles so that small practices could participate, but also provided a link to hospitals’ data 
management and quality improvement infrastructure.  Those physician practices which chose to 
participate remained subject to meeting ongoing quality and performance standards set by the 
organization (see Table 1). 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether small group and solo practitioners would 
have an opportunity to participate in a new model of care, the ACO.  The results demonstrated 
that none of the ACO prototype or predecessor models had included this cohort of medical 
practice without integration into a significantly larger organizational framework.   
 These findings contrasted with Fisher et al (2007) which first envisioned an ACO as a 
merely a “virtual” organization of providers.  In fact, the organizational framework as proposed 
in the March 31, 2011 release of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on ACOs required 
corporate organization under state law with a distinct Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), 
eliminating the possibility of virtual connections between providers (Hastings 2011).  The ACA 
had already restricted ACO participant eligibility to group practices or networks of individual 
practices in addition to hospitals with employed physicians or joint venture arrangements 
between hospitals and physician groups, but had not specified a minimum practice size.  The 
NPRM, however, reiterated that an ACO must be of a size sufficient to serve 5,000 Medicare 
beneficiaries (U.S. DHHS 2011).  This effectively eliminated solo practices, as the average 
patient panel for solo family physicians numbered 2000-3000 (Borglum 2010).   
 All cases in the results described the need for significant resources in quality reporting 
and data management, and specific mention was made indicating the large organizational 
commitment to support the required Information Technology structures. This ability was 
confirmed to be essential to meet the proposed NPRM required reporting of 65 separate quality 
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data elements, none of which could be gained from typical claims data systems available in small 
practices (McClellan 2011). 
 Financial impediments for small group and solo participation in ACOs were mentioned in 
the researched cases, and those concerns were supported by the release of the NPRM.  Start up 
and first year operating costs for an ACO were estimated at $1.7 million, as detailed in the 
impact portion of the NPRM.  In addition, ACOs are required to demonstrate significant capital 
reserves on hand.  Out of reach for small physician organizations, these requirements have 
favored hospital based ACOs (Lieberman 2011).   
 While the results confirmed the primary hypothesis of this research, namely that stand 
alone small group and solo practices would be unable to participate in the new payment model, 
the secondary hypothesis suggesting ACO’s promotion of physician hospital integration trends 
was only equivocally supported.  The findings did show that small group and solo practices 
would have to pursue integration in order to deal with financial and regulatory challenges to the 
model, as each case demonstrated levels of required practice integration.  However, although 
both  Greaney (2011) and Kocher & Sahni (2011) have anticipated that the formation of ACOs 
would increase physicians’ alignment or employment with hospitals or integrated delivery 
systems, this research did not confirm that physicians would choose to integrate in any larger 
numbers than they would have in absence of this new payment model.  In addition, the NPRM 
estimated that only 75 – 150 ACOs would be formed in the early years of the model (Iglehart 
2011b).  Since participation in the payment model is voluntary and the number of expected initial 
ACOs relatively modest, small groups or solo practitioners might not have sufficient incentive to 
change their practice culture based on ACOs alone.  
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 This study was limited due to the narrow evolving ACO regulatory environment.  The 
sample size of case studies found was limited, and only ACO prototypes could be examined as 
the study took place prior to Medicare’s ACO start up.  
CONCLUSION 
Accountable Care Organizations will launch as a new Medicare payment model in 2012.   While 
high hopes exist for this model to yield better healthcare at a lower cost, the structural 
requirements from an organizational, financial, and technological standpoint are complex.  
Independent small group and solo practice physicians will be unable to participate; there is no 
chair in the game for them.  
______________________________________________________________________________
Table 1: Case Studies in Accountable Care Organizations Formation and Participation of the  
Solo/Small Practice 
Case Authors Structure Payment model 
Solo/small 
practices 
PGP 
Demonstration 
Inglehart (2011), 
Heywood & 
Kosel (2011). 
Large group 
practices 
Shared savings 
None 
participated 
Vermont ACO 
Pilot 
Hester, Lewis, & 
McKethan 
(2010). 
PHO, FQHC, 
community 
hospital 
Shared savings, 
proposed 
None envisioned 
in pilot; thought 
to be too 
expensive   
BCBS of 
Massachusetts 
Alternative 
Quality Contract 
Chernew, 
Mechanic, 
Landon, & 
Safran (2011). 
Commercial 
payer 
Shared risk and 
savings 
Only if 
integrated into 
PHO or IPA 
Premier 
Healthcare 
Alliance 
Devore & 
Champion 
(2011). 
Integrated 
delivery systems 
Shared savings, 
proposed 
None; physicians 
described as in 
tightly aligned 
network 
Advocate 
Physician 
Partners/Advocate 
Health Care 
Shields, Patel, 
Manning, & 
Sacks (2011). 
Physician – 
Hospital joint 
venture 
Pay for 
performance 
adapted to shared 
savings 
Only if 
integrated into 
PHO 
ACO=Accountable Care Organization.  FQHC=Federally Qualified Health Center. 
IPA=Independent Practice Association.  PHO=Physician Hospital Organization. 
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